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INTRODUCTION
In evaluating the forays of Robert Post, David Bernstein, and Howard
Gillman into the history of Lochner-era jurisprudence, Barry Cushman comes
to accept that there are at least two faces of Lochnerism.1 The early twentiethcentury invalidation of a number of “economic” regulations, he says, rested
sometimes on a principle of equality – the disapproval of “class legislation”
emphasized by Gillman – and sometimes on a principle of liberty
(characterized in different ways by Post and Bernstein) to the effect that certain
areas of each individual’s life must be treated as immune to the government’s
regulatory powers altogether.2 Cushman also acknowledges, however, that
these two principles might really be one.3 Just as the idioms of constitutional
equality and constitutional liberty in the present day can often (or always) be
said to supply equally eligible modes for arguing against any particular
government action, so might the analogous idioms of the Lochner era. Rather
than try to resolve the question whether there was only one or maybe two faces
of Lochnerism – or three if you separate Post and Bernstein – I will instead
offer what may be an additional face of Lochnerism.
To find another angle on Lochnerism, I thought I would look at the
jurisprudence of the man commonly thought to be the Lochner wing’s fiercest
foe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes wrote the famously stinging
dissents in Lochner and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital4 and generally seems to
have advocated a jurisprudence that was antithetical to that of the Lochner
Court. But the compelling reason for looking at Holmes is not that he was a
reliably anti-Lochner justice, consistently pointing out the flaws in that
jurisprudence. Rather, as Cushman notes, he joined many a Lochner-era
majority in striking down a number of economic regulations.5 He even wrote
∗

1

Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. xx,
xx (2005) (asserting that there are two interpretations of Lochner-era decisions: the
traditional, which holds that these decisions were based on the principle of neutrality, and
the more recent, which holds that these decisions were based on the principle of individual
liberty and autonomy).
2
Id. at xx.
3
Id. at xx (attempting to reconcile Gillman’s “class legislation” theory with both
Bernstein’s “liberty of contract” theory and Post’s “lifeworld” hypothesis). “”“”
4
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
5
Cushman, supra note 1 at xx (citing cases where Holmes, as part of the majority, struck
down various economic regulations).

quite a few opinions in such cases. So what do we make of him? Was he
important mainly as a kind of legal crank or prophet, irrelevant in his own
time, however much he might speak to later generations? Or was he in fact a
mainstream justice, whose unique powers of expression and rhetorical
iconoclasm only manifested the main lines of Lochner-era jurisprudence in an
especially revealing manner?
To explore these questions, I’ll look at a more or less arbitrarily limited run
of Holmes’s own judicial writing in Fourteenth Amendment cases. Without
doing a comprehensive, independent search of my own, I gathered all of the
Holmes Fourteenth Amendment opinions that I was able to find in a quick
search of Cushman’s and others’ footnotes. I’ll also take a look at the
irresistible Adkins dissent (a Fifth Amendment case), but otherwise I’ve
excluded Fifth Amendment cases and Commerce Clause cases, despite close
doctrinal relevance. I think these opinions represent most of what Holmes
wrote in this area, but in any case they certainly represent a pretty good
sample.
The result of my reading is a few observations about the structure of
Holmes’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional review of economic cases and
how his chosen rhetoric might signify differences from and similarities to the
constitutional idioms discussed in Cushman’s paper. These suggestions are: 1)
that Holmes advocated a somewhat more pointed rule of deference to
legislatures than did most of his colleagues, but that his language in this
respect was far less radical than is often supposed;6 2) that, while he expressed
disgust at the uses to which the language of “liberty of contract” and the
language of “classification” were put, his own deployment of “takings”
language in a number of cases manifested values and concerns very similar to
those of the other justices; 3) that, in cases that others might decide by
reference to unconstitutional conditions,7 he seized the chance to vindicate a
rather extreme version of state autonomy that he thought indispensable to the
“scheme of the Union” even after the Fourteenth Amendment had scaled back
states’ rights; in the face of the ever-expanding federal commerce power, the
Court had to preserve some residual principle of state power – not because
state autonomy was a good idea but simply because the Constitution still
commanded judges to recognize some such sphere.
Running through these propositions, moreover, was Holmes’s eagerness to
find positive law and follow wherever it led.8 For the most part, Holmes really

6

See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 131 (1993); Jack M.
Balkin, Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. LAW REV. xx, xx (2005).
7
On unconstitutional conditions, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). For a thorough survey of the cases in
Holmes’s time, see generally Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935).
8
Holmes’s positivism is, of course, widely acknowledged. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 120 (1993) (observing that
Holmes’s positivism was one of his chief jurisprudential commitments).
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wasn’t interested in defending any particular substantive policies of his own
but only his (sometimes perverse) desire to make himself into a great judge by
slavishly following positive law (including his chaste understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment), almost relishing the badness of the social or
economic policy that might result from his decisions. But did that positivism
and arguable perversity of temperament fundamentally separate him from the
other Justices? Or did the substance of his constitutional theory actually put
him more or less in the mainstream of the Court? The evidence of his opinions
suggests that he served less as prophet or as conscience of the Court and more
as the greatest – or only – literary figure of the Lochner Court. He used his
words as weapons to puncture platitudes, expose the empty lawyers’ rhetoric
of so many opinions, and thus clarify the true stakes and motives driving the
justices’ opinions. But, as important as such rhetorical contributions were and
are, it is equally true and important that he did not separate himself much from
his fellow justices’ methods, values, and jurisprudence.
I.

THE LOCHNER DISSENT AND JUDICIAL R ESTRAINT

Holmes’s Lochner dissent is probably more famous than any of the other
opinions in the case, and some of the individual aphorisms in the case are
probably even more famous than the dissent as a whole. Yet the sting of the
dissent turns out to serve a far less radical legal position than is sometimes
supposed.
First, the Lochner dissent did not so much reject “liberty of contract” as a
category of constitutional analysis as embrace a traditional kind of restraint in
using such categories. Responding to a majority opinion that rested squarely
on liberty of contract and the heightened scrutiny that protection of that liberty
demanded of the Court, Holmes exposed the relativity of any such “right” by
pointing out how often it had been eroded with the Court’s blessing.9 Given
that record and tradition, the judge’s role was generally to let legislatures do
what they wanted with this fluid “right.”10 And Holmes was far from alone in
advocating such substantial deference. The dissent of Harlan, joined by White
and Day, said that “the rule is universal that a legislative enactment . . . is
never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly
and palpably in excess of legislative power” or “unless the regulations are so
utterly unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the

9
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (demonstrating
that the Court frequently upheld statutes “cutting down the liberty of contract”). A nice
discussion of Holmes’s well known impatience with “rights” can be found in G. Edward
White’s account of the Lochner dissent in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 328 (1993) (discussing how Holmes was “deeply suspicious” of words like
“right” and “liberty of contract,” because he thought of them as “vague generalizations,”
and “nothing but prophecies”).
10
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution does
not embody a particular economic theory, and that the Court should not determine the
constitutionality of statutes based on their own opinions).
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property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and in a manner
wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed . . . .”11 These words, like
Holmes’s, were pretty strong, but they only echoed the “reasonable doubt” or
“doubtful case” rule, which had peppered constitutional opinions since at least
the early nineteenth century and which remained an established doctrine of
constitutional law into the Lochner Era.12 Harlan’s call for restraint simply
paralleled Holmes’s own insistence that legislatures be allowed wide freedom,
limited only by “fundamental principles” of law.13
So why didn’t Holmes join Harlan’s dissent? His own opinion suggests that
he objected only to Harlan’s willingness to resort to empirical evidence to
sustain the reasonableness of the Lochner statute as a health regulation.
Contrasting his opinion to Harlan’s, Holmes insisted that “[i]t does not need
research” to show that the statute could be understood as rationally related to
the state’s interest in public health.14 To sign on to the other dissenters’
empirical “research” on that score was to say that a legislature’s impingement
on the liberty of contract (real, though it was) was something special, requiring
special fact-finding and justification – beyond common sense and dominant
opinion – rather than simple judicial recognition of the plausibility of the
statute. So did this separate him from Harlan’s jurisprudence in some
important way? Or did it simply reflect his rhetorical combativity? Perhaps he
exhibited a deeper insight into the scope of judicial competence, but he evinced
little difference from Harlan in methods of actually deciding cases.
After all, Harlan had not declared that such empirical evidence was
necessary, and his statement of the standard of judicial review certainly didn’t
suggest so; he just saw no reason to ignore such evidence, apparently, when it
was easily available. And, like Harlan, Holmes was very clear that he too
would strike down legislation in the right case.15 Thus, immediately after
announcing the “general proposition” that judges’ pet economic theories or
other notions of good policy should not control their judgments in
constitutional cases, Holmes declared that, “General propositions do not decide
concrete cases.”16 He was not referring here (as I had always casually
assumed) to the majority’s arid principles of liberty of contract or laissez-faire
– or at least not immediately to them. Instead, he referred most immediately to
his own “proposition just stated,” that judges should not use the Fourteenth

11

Id. at 67-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For the early period, see, for example, SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 60-65, 130-32, 157-61 (1990) (tracing the “doubtful case” rule
through 18th- and 19th-century cases). For a statement nearly contemporaneous with the
Lochner period, see James B. Thayer’s classic article, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
13
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14
Id.
15
Id. (contending that a law could be invalidated on constitutional grounds so long as a
rational man would conclude that the law infringed on fundamental principles of law).
16
Id.
12
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Amendment as an excuse to “prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion” – i.e., to invalidate a statute.17 Applicable as that general principle of
restraint might prove to be in Lochner, it was equally true, he suggested, that
judges should intervene whenever a rational person would have to admit that a
statute flouted “fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.”18
In other words, although Holmes had made a big deal of his own
commitment to restraint, he also acknowledged that that restraint must bow
before the more general principle that judges had to recognize when
fundamental principles had been violated, just as the Lochner majority had. In
the end, he disagreed with the majority only on the question whether the New
York statute really was a plausible health regulation, and with Harlan only on
the question whether discussion of available empirical research was called for
in deflating the majority’s assumptions. Although Holmes wielded a terribly
sharp rhetorical knife, he used it to defend a traditional and conventional
theory of constitutional review. If he didn’t mind turning that knife even on
his allies, that was less because there was a deep jurisprudential gulf between
him and Harlan than because, as a matter of aesthetics as much as anything
else, he preferred to dismiss a mistaken majority in a handful of paragraphs
that would offer no respect or quarter to the purveyors of judicial pretense.
Holmes subsequently reiterated his commitment to restraint on a number of
occasions, but his Adkins dissent deserves special notice. There, Holmes
reiterated his Lochner argument in the context of federal legislation and the
Fifth (rather than Fourteenth) Amendment.19 Writing only a few years after
Bunting v. Oregon 20 had apparently offered Lochner “a deserved repose,” 21
Holmes impatiently expanded on his earlier resistance to the notion that liberty
of contract was something special in constitutional analysis: “The earlier
decisions . . . went no farther than an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to
follow the ordinary callings. Later that innocuous generality was expanded
into the dogma, Liberty of Contract.”22 In reality, he argued, a statute’s
impingement on liberty of contract revealed very little about whether the
statute was constitutional or not, as his citations to a flood of cases easily
proved.23 Holmes’s impatience with the majority’s “dogma” extended as well

17

Id.
Id.
19
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 568-71 (1923) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
20
243 U.S. 426, 433-34, 438 (1917) (sustaining a statute establishing a ten-hour
maximum work day and providing time-and-a-half overtime pay for up to three hours per
day for factory workers as a valid exercise of state power on the grounds that it was
necessary to preserve employee health).
21
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
22
Id. at 568.
23
Id. at 568-69 (citing examples of laws that had been upheld despite interfering with the
liberty of contract).
18
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to arguments in the “class legislation” idiom: “The fact that the statute
warrants classification, which like all classifications may bear hard upon some
individuals, . . . is no greater infirmity than is incident to all law.”24 But
Holmes did not condemn all judicial intervention by way of the Due Process
Clause. As argued further below, Holmes happily invalidated legislation when
he could do so in terms of “takings,” and he would have been happy to strike
down the statute in Adkins if its chosen means had “compel[led] anybody to
pay anything” or otherwise appeared assimilable to an unconstitutional
“taking.”25 Finding, however, that the Adkins statute suggested no taking by
the authorities, Holmes again disdained the government’s effort to prove the
value of the legislation by reference to empirical research when the merest
glance at the realities of the world (through the lens of judicial notice) showed
all that needed to be shown – that is, that reasonable persons might believe the
statute to serve the “public good.”26
A nice tip-off that Holmes’s own colleagues considered his distinctiveness
to lie more in his rhetoric than in his jurisprudence comes in Chief Justice
Taft’s dissent in Adkins. The rather conservative Taft wrote separately from
Holmes not because of any serious disagreement on the substance of Holmes’s
objections but because of Holmes’s rhetorical vehemence and sweep: “But for
my inability to agree with some general observations in the forcible opinion of
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, who follows me, I should be silent and merely record
my concurrence in what he says.”27
In sum, if Holmes could not restrain his rhetoric as he responded to the
evasions and dogmas of his colleagues’ written work, he hardly invented or
even extended the brand of judicial restraint that he so colorfully advertised
and that many, if not all, of his colleagues practiced with him.
II.

“TAKINGS” C ASES

Holmes’s conventionality becomes all the more clear when one considers
that he joined his colleagues quite a few times in using the Fourteenth
Amendment to invalidate statutes and wrote a number of the opinions in those
cases himself. He may have preferred the language of “takings” to that of
“liberty” or “equality,” perhaps because it seemed to offer a more disciplined
sort of rhetoric for a judge, a rhetoric more conducive to his own overriding
ambition to achieve judicial greatness when all around him appeared so sloppy
and political. Nevertheless, his own chosen language necessarily left him
making the same kinds of judgments that the rest of the Court made with their
sometimes different rhetorical tools.
The main category of cases in which Holmes’s opinions for the Court
invalidated legislation involved what he saw as a takings aspect of the
24

Id. at 570.
Id. See infra pp. 10-18 (discussing cases where Holmes invalidated legislation based
on unconstitutional takings).
26
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570-71.
27
Id. at 567 (Taft, J., dissenting).
25
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Fourteenth Amendment, not the Takings Clause as such nor the Takings
Clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. When Holmes
identified a “taking of private property” without adequate compensation, he did
not hesitate to step in and strike down the statute any more than his colleagues
might have done when spying an “arbitrary classification” or an erosion of the
“liberty of contract.” Taken one way, his Lochner dissent might have
suggested that, as long as “dominant opinion” considered a regulated party’s
loss non-compensable, the usual and justifiable sort of price that one pays for
living in a well regulated society, then judges should never interfere. But, as
shown above, the engaging rhetoric of the dissent added up to no such position.
It ultimately stood only for the pedestrian proposition that judges had to make
judgments, that they had to reason as best they could about when a statute
crossed the line of irrationality, and thus unconstitutionality, in light of
American traditions. Holmes freely made that judgment whenever he thought
a statute looked too much like a taking of private property, whether in the form
of money exacted, labor compelled, tangible property appropriated, or even
opportunities for profit denied.
Thus, for example, in Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Central Stock
Yards Co.,28 a provision of Kentucky’s Constitution required one railway to
surrender its cars to another for the final leg of a trip without, according to
Holmes, affording the first carrier compensation for the temporary loss of its
property and its use by another party:
In view of the well-known and necessary practice of connecting roads, we
are far from saying that a valid law could not be passed to prevent the
cost and loss of time entailed by needless transhipment or breaking bulk,
in case of an unreasonable refusal by a carrier to interchange cars with
another for through traffic. We do not pass upon the question. It is
enough to observe that such a law perhaps ought to be so limited as to
respect the paramount needs of the carrier concerned, and at least could
be sustained only with full and adequate regulations for his protection
from the loss or undue detention of cars, and for securing due
compensation for their use. The Constitution of Kentucky is simply a
universal, undiscriminating requirement, with no adequate provisions
such as we have described.29
As these words suggest, Holmes did not doubt that the Kentucky regulation
had very plausible justification as a facilitation of commerce within the state.
But rather than simply deem this the sort of regulation for which a reasonable
person could easily divine the public justification, Holmes judged it a
deprivation of property without due process of law, at least so long as
Kentucky failed to provide adequate compensation.30
28

212 U.S. 132, 139 (1909) (citing the Kentucky Constitution, which stated that all
railroad companies were required to transport, receive, load and unload all freight passing
through without discrimination as to payment or charges).
29
Id. at 143-44.
30
Id. at 145.
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Another aspect of the same Kentucky regulation required one railroad to
provide switching services to another under certain circumstances, even though
those services were not separately paid for: “If the principle is sound, every
road into Louisville, by making a physical connection with the Louisville &
Nashville, can get the use of its costly terminals and make it do the switching
necessary to that end, upon simply paying for the service of carriage.”31 Not
only did the state compel the use of private property for public ends, but it
compelled a private company to provide labor and services to another for these
same ends. “To require such [services] from a railroad is to take its property in
a very effective sense, and cannot be justified unless the railroad holds that
property subject to greater liabilities than those incident to its calling alone.”32
For Holmes this was essentially a takings case, a case that could be
distinguished from ordinary regulation since the state compelled a person to
part with physical property and, perhaps even more compellingly, to provide
services and labor that it had not freely committed itself to by virtue of
entering into the “calling” of railroading.
Similarly, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska,33 Holmes assumed
the legitimacy of a statutory effort to prevent a grain-elevator monopoly. He
even assumed that the statute might require a railroad to service elevators other
than its own.34 But he bridled at the requirement that the railroad itself build
and pay for the necessary side tracks and do so whenever the operator of such
an elevator so requested.35 Using the conventional judicial language of the
day, Holmes declared, “Clearly, no such obligation is incident to their public
duty, and to impose it goes beyond the limit of the police power.”36 Even if
the statute were shrunk to a more reasonable shape, Holmes wondered, “Why
should the railroads pay for what, after all, are private connections? We see no
reason.”37 Holmes perhaps bridled at the thought that the railroad could be
compelled to construct these tracks (as he bridled at the Kentucky railroad’s
being required to perform services it had not contracted for), but ultimately he
only insisted that they could not be required to go uncompensated for the work:
“[T]his statute is unconstitutional . . . because it does not provide indemnity for
what it requires.”38
In Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission of Louisiana,39 Holmes
similarly and impatiently found that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the
Railroad Commission of Louisiana from compelling a company to provide

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id.
Id.
217 U.S. 196 (1910).
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208.
251 U.S. 396 (1920).
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services that could not be operated at a profit.40 The company had run a
railroad at a profit as long as its parent company’s logging business had paid a
large share of the freight.41 When the parent company ran out of logs, the
railroad shut down, but the state Railroad Commission ordered it to continue
operations as long as the losses did not use up the profits of the parent
company.42 Holmes and the Court found this order “would deprive the
plaintiff of its property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States . . . .”43 After all, even
though public needs might justify a requirement that a railroad fulfill its charter
obligations even when it could only do so at a loss, the private decision to stop
operating the railroad altogether was different: “The plaintiff may be making
money from its sawmill and lumber business but it no more can be compelled
to spend that than it can be compelled to spend any other money to maintain a
railroad for the benefit of others who do not care to pay for it.”44 Here as
elsewhere, Holmes could as easily have said that this order was
unconstitutional as the equivalent of “class legislation,” a naked redistribution
of property from A to B; or he could have called it a violation of the railroad’s
“liberty of contract,” its freedom to contract or not with whomever it chose for
whatever services it chose to provide. Any of these idioms would have made
sense of the case, and each of them would have (and did) require an exercise of
judgment, not a mechanical application of a clear rule.
Finally, in Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage District, 45
Holmes was able to identify a “definite sum of money” to which the boat
company was entitled and which the state sought to keep.46 The company had
paid certain tolls under duress at a time when no such tolls were authorized by
the state.47 The state then sought to keep the money through retroactive
legislation (“ratification” of the tolls).48 But the state’s argument, said Holmes,
once “[s]tripped of conciliatory phrases” – Holmes’s favorite activity – simply
sought to “take away from a private party a right to recover money that [was]
due when the act [was] passed.”49 The state could no more extinguish this
right to a definite sum of money “without compensation” than it could
extinguish a conventional “claim for goods sold.”50
Relying on the language of takings, even though the Takings Clause itself
was inapplicable to these cases, Holmes disdained the languages of liberty and
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 399.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 399.
258 U.S. 338 (1922).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 338.
Id..
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
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equality, presumably because they had proven overly attractive excuses for the
judiciary’s second-guessing of legislatures. Holmes’s “takings” cases, in
contrast, drew on more explicit language and tradition, or so he seems to have
believed. For a judge who really was more interested in achieving greatness in
his calling than in pressing a particular substantive agenda for the nation, those
virtues of the takings idiom would have been very seductive.
Another benefit of that idiom, though, might have been that it did advance a
major part of Holmes’s constitutional agenda, his conviction that individual
rights were never absolute – hardly “rights” at all in the face of the everpresent and necessarily superior demands of the public interest. The language
of takings never formally prevented whatever regulation the state saw fit to
enact; it never set up a right that was above utilitarian calculation. It only
required that the state pay for its regulations, at least in those cases where the
traditions of American law would unmistakably identify a compensable seizure
of a person’s labor, money, or physical property.
Here I might cite a passage from the criminal law chapter of Holmes’s THE
COMMON LAW, a passage that suggests that Holmes understood the
requirement of just compensation as having little to do with individual property
or contract rights and much to do with the necessity of protecting public power
by preventing it from undermining itself. Viewing criminal law as simply one
of many branches of social regulation, not altogether different from later
Progressive reform legislation, he impatiently disparaged the notion that
individuals have any unregulable “rights,” such as the Kantian right not to be
used as means to public ends.51 Yet he also provided a limiting principle for
the broad, utilitarian legislative discretion he thereby endorsed: a legislature
must not sacrifice the individual irrationally by imposing rules that are “too
severe for that community to bear.”52 And, to illustrate, he used a takings
analogy: the community, he noted, will seize “old family places” from
individuals for public use, regardless of claims of property or other rights, and
it must be allowed to do so in the public interest.53 But, of course, the
community also traditionally pays market compensation for the taking – an
amount probably inadequate to the deprived owner but adequate in the eyes of
a reasonable member of the community.54 All communities sacrifice the
individual’s interests for the sake of the public’s, but no civilized community
sacrifices the individual more than necessary, Holmes said.55 Why? Because
doing so would itself undermine the public interest, would manifest not a
violation of individual rights but a rule “too severe for that community to

51

O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 43, 46-47 (1881) (claiming that our criminal
law does “treat the individual as a means to an end, and uses him as a tool to increase the
general welfare at his own expense”).
52
Id. at 50.
53
Id. at 43 (alleging that a civilized government will not sacrifice the citizen more than it
can help, but will sacrifice the citizen’s “will and welfare” for the good of the rest).
54
Id.
55
Id.
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bear,”56 a rule “too hard for the average member of the community,”57 a rule
that must defeat its own purposes because it violates the well founded
judgments of the main body of the community. The takings idiom, it would
seem, was specially congenial to Holmes’s view of law as a positive emanation
of state power rather than as a catalogue of “rights.”
If Holmes embraced such an argument for the use of “takings” language
rather than his colleagues’ preferred idioms, he still had to acknowledge that it
was judges – not the unmediated voice of “the community” – who must apply
the Constitution to particular cases. And judges could have done the work of
judicial review – imparted their measure of rationality to state power – through
any of the idioms of constitutional law then current. Holmes seemed to glom
on to the language of takings because of its relative determinacy and its easy
affinity with the Fourteenth Amendment’s own language of deprivation of
property. But determinacy is often in the eye of the beholder. If it has not
already been obvious that Holmes’s own takings opinions were far from
determinate applications of takings rules, then Holmes’s most famous takings
case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 clearly makes the point.
Mahon presents a Holmes who was as ready as any of his colleagues simply
to judge matters of degree in constitutional law rather than deferring to the
legislature whenever a reasonable person might endorse the statute. To this
point, perhaps Holmes had not had to confront so starkly his awareness that the
difference between a regulation and a taking could not always be easily drawn.
The cases discussed above contained pretty plausible examples of regulations
that looked overtly like takings from the outset, never even triggering the usual
rhetoric of deference to legislative judgment. But Mahon was trickier,
suggesting that the deferential review Holmes abstractly advocated for most
Fourteenth Amendment cases was being arbitrarily disregarded in Holmes’s
practically de novo review in takings cases.
In Mahon, the coal company was not compelled to perform any service, nor
deprived directly of any of its property or money. It was simply deprived of a
preexisting right to mine coal – an opportunity for future profits – insofar as
the mining would cause subsidence of the residential lots overhead.59 The
statute might thus be a regulation of property or it might be a taking. So
Holmes had to acknowledge that the question was a matter of degree: “The
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”60 Unlike in the
previous cases he had written, the taking here was not a simple matter of
common sense and “general propositions,” a case of knowing it when he saw
it: “As we already have said this is a question of degree – and therefore cannot
be disposed of by general propositions. But we regard this as going beyond
56
57
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59
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any of the cases decided by this Court.”61
Recognizing that the question whether there was a “taking” here was just a
matter of degree, he nevertheless failed to intimate that the state deserved any
deference for its policy. Nor did he argue, as his Lochner standard should have
required, that this regulation would necessarily be deemed unreasonable by any
rational and fair person. (With Justice Brandeis dissenting, he may not have
relished such an argument.) For Holmes, it was simply the case that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned takings and that this regulation seemed like a
taking. Why did it seem so? Simply because, if judged otherwise, this
regulation might threaten the very survival of “private property,”62 a fairly silly
and uncharacteristically melodramatic argument for Holmes.
In this case, judging degrees as he was, Holmes might as well have
concluded that the regulation deprived the coal company of its “liberty of
contract” or transferred its property from A (the coal company) to B (the
surface residents). But he did not. Instead, he relied again on the idiom of
takings, apparently to replace the dogmas of the Lochnerites with a principle
that, unlike “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,”63 was indeed explicitly
enacted in the Constitution as positive law. But that language eventually
returned him to questions of degree and indeterminacy anyway, in the face of
which he cheerily denied to the legislature of Pennsylvania in 1922 the sort of
deference he had championed for the legislature of New York in 1905.
III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
If Holmes’s positivist formalism in takings cases tended to erase his
philosophy of deference, he adopted a different formalist extreme when
confronted with claims of unconstitutional conditions. In these cases, he
insisted that there were areas of regulation where the states retained a degree of
autonomy and sovereignty that precluded even the most deferential rationality
review. Where the state could have “arbitrarily” prohibited the conditioned
activity at the outset, Holmes argued, even the most irrational subsequent
conditions on the activity were beyond federal constitutional review.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman,64 Holmes
dissented from an invalidation of a Kansas “charter fee,” imposed by the state
on the corporation as a condition of doing business within the state.65 The fee
might be excessive or otherwise unjustifiable, but the entry of a foreign
corporation into the state to do local business was “a matter over which a state
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has absolute arbitrary power,”66 wrote Holmes. The state, therefore, could
place absolutely any conditions it wanted on such local business. It did not
matter to Holmes that to grant a state such unlimited power over the local
business of a national company like Western Union might realistically amount
to significant power over the company’s interstate business as well.67 Rather,
apparently with one eye on the rising tide of the federal commerce power and
the other on the constitutionally mandated state sovereignty that seemed to be
sinking behind the horizon, Holmes opted for the result that was “more true to
the scheme of the Union,” an utterly arbitrary sovereignty for the states but
only in limited areas that could be defined out of the federal commerce
power.68
Similarly, but even more dramatically, in City of Denver v. Denver Union
Water Co.,69 Holmes dissented from a ruling that a private water company was
entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to an adequate rate of return for its
services.70 Holmes reasoned that, since the city could at any time arbitrarily
exclude the water company from the city altogether, it certainly could offer the
company as low a rate of return as it liked, leaving the company to abandon the
business if it so chose.71 Holmes acknowledged the reality that the water
company, which had laid pipe throughout the city, and the city, which did not
own the pipe, were mutually dependent.72 But he declared that “the mutual
dependence of the parties upon each other in fact does not affect the
consequences of their independence of each other in law.”73 Since the city
could, in law if not in reality, exclude the water company for any reason at all,
it could also set utterly inadequate rates for the company.74
In these cases, Holmes declined to do what he was famous for doing in at
least some other cases – looking behind the formalisms (like liberty of
contract) to account for the reality of the situation. Although Holmes had been
very willing to halt the dragooning of businesses into the service of the state
without just compensation, he had no qualms about the state equally destroying
the property of a business through the mere regulation of rates. Moreover, the
standard he applied was not even deferential rationality review but absolute
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judicial withdrawal from the case.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the formalism involved in such distinctions, Holmes
carried out judicial review in at least three different ways: deference to
dominant opinion in the execution of rationality review (Lochner); no apparent
deference at all in cases where he detected “takings”; and no constitutional
review at all in cases where he supposed the Fourteenth Amendment to have
left absolute state sovereignty in place. This last result seemed to rest on a
belief that “the scheme of the Union” must survive the commerce power and
its ever-growing potential to render a constitutionally, positivistically required
federalism nugatory. Thus although Holmes seemed to embrace a judicial role
in imparting rationality to public power, he did not seem to believe that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of rationality inhered in the notion of
government or republicanism or law; it was simply a (very desirable)
requirement that the makers of the Fourteenth Amendment had generally
chosen to place on the states. But, as a merely positive imposition, it went no
further than it went; Holmes seemed to take a certain positivistic delight in
discovering areas of state power that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach
at all, perhaps because these small pockets of unreviewable arbitrariness
reminded him (and the Platonists on the Court, he hoped) that rationality in
government was a mere choice, which dominant opinion could endorse or not
as it liked.75
Unlike some other justices of his time, Holmes did not clearly manifest a
particular political orientation in his judging. Rather, he revealed a ceaseless
ambition to find greatness in his profession (and be recognized for it). Holmes
himself might have admitted that the greatness he sought in a life on the bench
could not be had by the creation of distinctive doctrine (the unconstitutional
conditions cases that he lost could have taught him that). The very nature of
law, forever honoring prior authority, discouraged explicit doctrinal
innovation. But, in Holmes’s age, as in ours, the law seemed to cry out for
someone to cut through the humbug of judicial rhetoric. I think that Holmes
did indeed contribute (along with other justices) a third idiom of Fourteenth
Amendment review to the two that Cushman’s paper has identified,76 a
language of takings which turned out to be as conventional as the other two
and nearly interchangeable with them. Each of the three fit easily with a
general philosophy of deference in judicial review, and each called on the
justices simply to exercise judgment when faced with a claim that a legislature
had gone too far in light of American traditions of law. But Holmes’s
positivism, iconoclasm, and rhetorical skill persistently exposed the political
75
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qualities of the justices’ work for all to see. And at least in part, that is where
his greatness lay and where, I suspect, he was happy for it to lie.
It is true that, having exposed the arbitrariness and politics underlying the
legalisms of “liberty of contract” and “arbitrary classification,” he only (and
inevitably) substituted his own mainstream legalisms of “takings” and the like.
In the meantime, however, he had enshrined in Supreme Court case law the
rhetorical tools by which, as he said in a different setting, “the dragon” – any
inherited legalism – could be gotten “out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, [where] you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength.”77 Holmes’s third face of Lochnerism did not really contribute a
functionally different doctrine to Lochner-era constitutional review. But his
Lochner-era contributions, revealing the “faces” of the law as “masks,” made it
forever afterwards an embarrassment – even for a judge – to pretend that the
language of law could wholly conceal the political dimensions of the Court.
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